Dakota Beacon

On December 1, 2009, President Obama delivered his Afghanistan surge speech at West Point. Four days later, on December 5, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, General Barry R. McCaffrey (U.S. Army, Retired) released his After Action Report (AAR) prepared as a memo for the Head of the Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy. The AAR dealt with his recent strategic and operational assessment of security operations in Afghanistan.

President Obama’s speech was overtly political. General McCaffrey’s AAR provided a realistic military assessment.

In the spirit of full disclosure, I confess my bias. Years ago, as young officers, McCaffrey and I were classmates at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College sharing tactics classes together. I was as impressed then, as I am now, with his keen intellect.

General McCaffrey based his AAR on a series of personal observations and conversations at the invitation of General David Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command. Given the improbability that his observations would receive coverage beyond a small coterie of professionals, I share them here.

General McCaffrey opened his report by rendering the obligatory kudos to President Obama’s West Point speech. He then deftly pointed out that the speech was “an appropriate political statement which delivered resources to his field commander.” He also took note of the president’s explanation why he would not downsize or withdraw “and face the short term political and military disaster that would immediately ensue.”

With his opening remarks, General McCaffrey frankly acknowledged “there is precious little support for the Afghan operation among the American people. 66% say it is not worth fighting for. Only 45% of Americans and few among his political party approve of President Obama’s handling of the war.”

Continuing with his blunt assessment, the general goes on to state “we are unlikely to achieve our political and military goals in 18 months. This will inevitably become a three to ten year strategy to build a viable Afghan state with their own security force that can allow us to withdraw. It may well cost us an additional $300 billion and we are likely to suffer thousands more U.S. casualties.”

General McCaffrey’s conclusion regarding America’s objective may be summarized in one sentence. “Our focus must not now be on an exit strategy -- but effective execution of the political, economic, and military measures required to achieve our purpose.”

Although the president’s speech was billed as his Afghanistan strategy speech, he spent remarkably little time discussing Afghanistan. It resembled a patronizing lecture to the Corps of Cadets about America’s failures.

President Obama’s speech was very much about placating as many sides of the political spectrum as possible. He never stated clearly the objective of the surge. He did not speak of winning the war. He never used the word “victory.” What he did establish was an eighteen-month artificial deadline for withdrawing U.S. forces from Afghanistan. He did not explain why he decided on eighteen months rather than fifteen months or twenty-four months. Nor did he explain why he authorized 30,000 rather than 40,000 or 50,000 additional troops.

Comparing the president’s speech to the general’s AAR, the general’s report clearly provided substance over form.

Of necessity, the president had to convey a long-delayed decision regarding field commander General Stan McChrystal’s request for reinforcements. The president was not enthusiastic about his obligation to make that decision. The demeanor of his speech showed as much.

Dennis M. Patrick can be contacted at P. O. Box 337, Stanley, ND 58784 or (JavaScript must be enabled to view this email address).